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How Did We Get Here? A Brief History of Britain’s 
Membership of the EU 
 








The shape of the UK’s relations with the EU has been defined by its unique 
historical understanding of its place in the world, writes Daniel Kenealy. He argues 
that, more recently, the increasing Eurosceptic dimension of the Conservative party 
and the electoral threat from UKIP combined to make a referendum on membership 
a likely eventuality.  
 
The Long Term: Britain as an Awkward European Partner? 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, the US took a strategic foreign policy decision to 
underwrite the security of Western Europe. It did this as a result of an altered 
balance of power. Put simply, the war transformed Europe from the centre of global 
politics to a component in a new balance of power between the US and the Soviet 
Union. 
 
Within Europe, France decided, in the early 1950s, to make a bold move. Foreign 
Minister Robert Schuman proposed a new institution: the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), which would place the coal and steel industries of Germany, 
France and several other European countries under international control. 
 
The aim was to take what were then considered industries essential to warfare and 
place them beyond the control of any one country. The underpinning idea was to 
make it less likely that any major European country could ever wage war against 
another. 
 
Whilst Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were content to join the 
ECSC, the UK opted to stay out. Within the British government, a combination of 
factors came together to determine that outcome. In elite circles, there was a strong 
belief that Britain remained, after World War II, a global power of the first rank, a 
status that would be compromised by joining new European institutions. 
 
This sense was coupled with a belief that Britain’s rightful role was to serve as a 
bridge between Europe and the US, and Europe and the Commonwealth, a role that 
it could only play if it stood aside from European integration. In addition, given that 
the ECSC did not permit the nationalisation of its members’ coal and steel 
industries, and that the post-war Labour Government was committed to such 
nationalisation, it would have been politically difficult for Britain to join. 
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Britain thus stood on the sidelines as six European countries took the first step 
towards integration. A few years later, between 1955-1957, those same six 
countries decided to establish the European Economic Community (EEC), which was 
a commitment to create a single market in which goods, services, people, and 
capital moved freely. 
 
This was the start of what today we call the European Union. It was driven by a 
desire to boost trade and economic growth. Once again, Britain stood aside in 1957, 
driven largely by an understanding of its role in the world that did not allow it to tie 
its fortunes too closely to the Continent. 
 
Knocking on the Door 
 
By the early 1960s Britain’s economic growth and foreign direct investment were 
disappointing compared to the EEC six. As it became clear that we were lagging 
behind our Continental neighbours, the government changed tack and attempted to 
join them. 
 
Governments led by both parties – Harold Macmillan’s Conservatives and Harold 
Wilson’s Labour – tried in vain to secure membership throughout the 1960s. The 
obstacle was French President Charles De Gaulle who, in an attempt to further his 
geopolitical aim of French leadership of a larger European bloc in global politics, 
twice said ‘Non’ to British membership in 1961 and 1967. 
 
Eventually Britain’s persistent knocking on the door of the EEC paid off. De Gaulle 
had departed the scene and, with the European balance of power shifting clearly 
and decisively in favour of West Germany, French President Georges Pompidou lifted 
his country’s opposition to British membership. 
 
Membership was secured on 1 January 1973 under the Conservative government of 
Edward Heath. But Heath lost power the following year and in 1975, shortly after 
joining, Britain held its first Europe referendum to decide whether or not it should 
stay in the EEC. 
 
The result revealed deep splits in the Labour party – then in government under 
Harold Wilson – but, with the leadership of all main political parties (even Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservatives), and all national newspapers backing membership, 67 per 
cent voted in favour. The vote looked decisive, but in the event did nothing to settle 
‘the Europe Question’ in British politics. 
 
Almost from the outset, Britain was an awkward member of the EEC. Immediately 
upon joining, it sought to renegotiate the amount of money it paid to the EEC and 
to secure market access for New Zealand dairy products. In the 1980s, then Prime 
Minister Thatcher began an ongoing battle with the EEC about Britain’s budget 
contribution, securing the infamous ‘rebate’ to compensate for Britain’s 
disproportionately low benefit from EEC agricultural subsidies. 
 
Europe and Party Politics 
 
  
European Futures | Article No 106                                                                        Page 3 of 5 
Article No 106  
Despite these ‘battles’, the Conservative party was broadly in favour of Britain’s 
membership throughout the 1980s. There was some Euroscepticism within the 
party, but Mrs Thatcher was instrumental in the EEC’s biggest leap forward since 
1957, the Single European Act of 1986. The Act, which promised to construct a true 
single market in goods, services, people and capital by 1992, appealed to the 
market-based instincts of the Conservatives. 
 
The divisions within the Labour party over EEC membership became more 
pronounced during the later 1970s. During these years, it was the left of the Labour 
party – led by figures such as Tony Benn and Michael Foot – that voiced the 
loudest opposition to the EEC. 
 
In 1983, Labour entered the General Election with a campaign commitment to 
withdrawing. However, once Neil Kinnock had replaced Michael Foot as leader, 
Labour became more moderate, leading to a party political role reversal by the 
1990s, as the Conservative  party grew more Eurosceptic in contrast to their 
position in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Thatcher quickly turned against the EEC after the passage of the Single European 
Act. Disturbed by what she saw as a direction of travel towards some form of 
European super state – with a single currency and a more federal structure – she 
famous declared ‘No, No, No’ in the House of Commons to plans for further and 
deeper integration. 
 
Her bête noire during these years was the EEC Commission President Jacques 
Delors, who himself became a symbol of power-grabbing European officials. The 
Sun, in November 1990, famously ran the headline ‘Up Yours Delors’. 
 
Just a few weeks, later Thatcher had left office in large part because of major 
divisions in her party on Europe. John Major, who was more sympathetic to the EEC 
than she had become by the late 1980s, replaced her. The ‘Europe Question’ would 
dog his seven-year premiership and he even resigned and put himself up for re-
election as Conservative party leader in an attempt to silence the issue. 
 
Although he won that contest in 1995, it revealed a pronounced division within the 
Conservative party, a division that would grow once the party moved into 
opposition in 1997. During Major’s premiership, Europe made big strides forward 
and Britain suffered a major humiliation with the forced exit from the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM). 
 
With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the EU was born. Although Britain secured opt-
outs from the single currency (the euro) and on some social policy legislation, the 
EU moved forward towards political union. 
 
A More Sympathetic Tone 
 
The years of Labour government under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown saw a very 
different tone. Both were far more sympathetic to the EU than their Conservative 
predecessors. Blair signed Britain up for the social policies from which Major had 
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won an opt-out and, along with French President Jacques Chirac, launched the 
European Security and Defence Policy. 
 
Blair was even happy to consider membership of the euro, but Gordon Brown 
remained opposed. These were, generally speaking, years of friendlier UK-EU 
relations, with the UK championing the enlargement of the EU to the former Soviet 
states. 
 
During thirteen years of Labour government, the party political positions became 
more concrete. Labour was the major party most firmly committed to Britain’s EU 
membership. Although most successive Conservative party leaders continued to 
favour Britain’s membership (at least in public), the party that they led grew more 
and more Eurosceptic, creating tremendous pressure on those leaders. 
 
The Short Term: A Prime Minister Losing Control? 
 
This growing Euroscepticism within the Conservative party is perhaps the key 
short-term trigger for the present referendum. Upon becoming leader of the party 
in 2005, David Cameron moved to withdraw his party’s Members of the European 
Parliament from the mainstream centre-right party political grouping in Brussels. 
 
This was to win favour amongst the Eurosceptic wing of the party. Over the next 
decade, Cameron faced pressure from three sources: from within his party, from the 
British electorate and from developments within the EU itself. All three pushed him 
in a more Eurosceptic direction and towards his commitment to a referendum. 
 
First, the Conservative party – both at the grassroots level and also in terms of its 
elected MPs – grew more Eurosceptic. Even those who were not overwhelmingly 
committed to getting Britain out the EU were keen to see the powers of the EU 
reduced and the Brussels-based institutions dramatically reformed. 
 
Second, within British politics a new electoral force emerged that posed a clear and 
present danger to the Conservative party. UKIP, led by the charismatic Nigel Farage, 
began to gain electoral success with its intensely Eurosceptic message. Farage 
managed to link fears about immigration and societal change to Britain’s EU 
membership in a highly effective way. This created a pressure for Cameron to take 
on, and try to settle, the Europe Question. 
 
Third, the EU itself was hit very hard by the global economic crisis that broke out in 
late 2008. The result was bailouts for several countries that used the euro, new EU 
laws and institutions in the areas of banking and finance and the possibility of far 
deeper integration amongst those EU members in the Eurozone. Calls to ensure that 
the City of London was protected from EU overreach and that Britain – and other 
non-euro countries – could not be ganged up on and outvoted by euro countries 
grew louder. 
 
Those three factors – amongst others – pushed Cameron towards his commitment 
to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s EU membership, and to negotiate changes to 
the way the EU works, before holding an ‘in or out’ referendum. 
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Since becoming party leader in 2005, Cameron has been led by his party on the EU 
question much more than he has led his party. He has adopted a ‘kick-the-can-
down-the-road’ strategy, seeking to postpone the issue for as long as possible. 
Having won a surprising majority in the 2015 General Election, he could delay no 
more. He had staked his political legacy on winning a referendum that he did not 
especially want to have. 
 
Ever an Awkward Partner 
 
Britain’s EU referendum is the product of long- and short-term historical factors. 
The UK has never been a comfortable member of the EU. Britain stood aside during 
the early years of European integration, driven by a fundamentally different history 
to its continental partners, a different experience during World War II and a 
different idea of its role in the world. 
 
These differences created national stories, which entrenched those differences in 
what we might call the national mindset. Even after joining the EU in 1973, Britain 
has been an awkward partner, usually found opting-out of many key developments 
such as the euro, the Schengen passport-free area and many policies in the area of 
justice and home affairs. Such a long-term history may have made this referendum 
in some sense inevitable. 
 
However, in the short term, it is the internal politics of the Conservative party that 
have driven Britain to this point. A rising Euroscepticism within the party, coupled 
with the rise of UKIP, and developments within the EU that have pushed Britain into 
adopting a series of defensive positions, combined to pressure David Cameron into 
his strategy of ‘renegotiate and referendum’. 
 
Whatever the result on 23 June, Britain’s long and complicated relationship with the 
continent of Europe looks set to continue. The referendum will not settle Britain’s 
Europe Question. 
 
The article, co-published with the Centre on Constitutional Change, draws from the 
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